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Non governmental organizations have been active in Moldova since 1989, but a civil society 
started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after 
the country became independent in 1991. Since that time the establishment of a transitional civil 
society in Moldova is under way. However, starting from 2001, when the Communist Party won the 
general  elections,  development  of  the  nongovernmental  sector  has  become  slower.  Although 
several positive patterns evident at the end of the nineties indicate progress in the development of 
Moldovan non-governmental sector, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., freedom of media, 
human rights protection) in relation to which certain regress has been observed especially in the 
last two years. Media market in Moldova is far from being free, and protection of human rights 
remains to be a problem (in all respects, situation of non-governmental sector in Transnistria is 
much  worse  than  in  Moldova).  Finally,  it  needs  to  be  emphasized  that  critical  socio-economic 
situation seems to be the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. This is 
because further significant economic decline can provide fertile ground for non-democratic political 
forces and extremists. Economic collapse could be a real threat to the achievements in the area of 
democratization and civil society development. Thus, only results of a successful economic reform 
process  may  reverse  undesirable  patterns  and  change  socio-economic  situation  in  Moldova, 
increase income of population, decrease poverty, guarantee stability and irreversibility of Moldovan 
achievements in democratization and development of civil society.   Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions 
Preface 
Civil society in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has attracted 
increasing international attention over the past several years. While hopeful signs are emerging 
that indicate progress, other developments concerning the media and freedom of expression, rule 
of  law  and  corruption,  and  government  accountability  point  to  persistent  challenges  in  the 
transition.  Considering  such  developments,  Freedom  House  (FH)  with  the  support  of  the  U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) has embarked on an intensive exercise to review 
the aforementioned trends in selected countries (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) through detailed 
assessments of civil society and democratic institutions. The specific areas of interest include: (i) 
participation of youth in civic life (participation of youth movements in public affairs); (ii) public 
awareness campaigns and human rights (current and recent civil society efforts to conduct public 
awareness campaigns related to human and civil rights issues including free and fair elections, 
access to information, government transparency); (iii) freedom of media (factors affecting access to 
information and freedom of expression); (iv) think tanks and the reform agenda (role and impact of 
think  tanks  and  policy  institutes  in  shaping  the  current  reform  agenda,  including  constitutional 
reform, political reform, judicial reform, and foreign affairs and security sector reform). 
This report is one of the country papers prepared in the framework of FH project. Findings are 
based  on  available  statistical  data,  a  number  of  in-depth  interviews,  reports  of  international 
organizations, relevant secondary analyses that are available in the country, research papers in 
the academic literature, and other documents. Issues presented in the report were discussed with 
the members of civil society institutes in Moldova. Their willingness to cooperate and feedback is 
gratefully  acknowledged.  All  persons  who  have  kindly  accepted  to  have  an  interview  with  the 
members of the team are also acknowledged.  
The content of the paper is the sole responsibility of the authors and in no way represents the 
views of Freedom House. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
7 
1.  Moldova - Country Description 
1.1. Geographical and Historical Context 
The Republic of Moldova is a relatively new country located in the area of former Moldavian 
Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) - the second smallest republic of the former Soviet Union (SU). 
The country is landlocked between Ukraine in the north, east and south and Romania in the west. 
Its area (including Transnistria) is about 33 850 sq km1 and population amounts to 3.6 million (4.4 
million including Transnistria)2. 
Present-day  Moldova  formed  the  eastern  part  of  Moldavia  (Moldova  in  Romanian),  a 
principality  which  was  under  Ottoman Empire  since 16
th century.  In  1812, the  Russian  Empire 
annexed Bessarabia (Basarabia in Romanian), which includes today's Republic of Moldova and 
parts of present-day Ukraine. In early 1918, Moldova declared independence but was incorporated 
into Romania a few months later. This move was sanctioned by the 1920 Treaty of Paris but never 
recognized  by  the  Soviet  Union,  which  in  1924  established  the  Moldavian  Autonomous  Soviet 
Socialist Republic on the eastern bank of the Dniester (Nistru in Romanian) river, as part of the 
Ukrainian SSR. After the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in 
1939, Romania was forced to cede Moldova east of the river Prut (along with northern Bukovina) to 
the Soviet Union in 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, it was under Romanian control. In 1944 the 
Soviets reclaimed the territory, and in 1947 the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was 
established. The same year, the territory was formally ceded to the Soviet Union under the Paris 
Peace Treaty.3  
The  population  of  Moldova  is  ethnically  differentiated.  The  main  ethnic  groups  include: 
Moldavians/Romanians  (64.5  percent),  Ukrainians  (13.8  percent),  Russians  (13.0  percent), 
Gagauz (3.5 percent) andBulgarians (1.8 percent).4 The other nationalities comprise together a 
little less than 3.5 percent of the population. Although Romanian is the official language in the 
country5, Russian and Gagauz (a Turkish dialect) are also used by relatively large parts of the 
population. Moldova is the most densely populated country in the CIS (129 persons per sq. km), 
but at the same time one of the least urbanized (53.9 percent of population lives in rural areas).
6 
                                                 
1 Source: World Bank Development Indicators database, 2003. 
2 As in July 1997. 
3  OSCE/ODIHR  Election  Observation  Mission.  Republic  Moldova,  Local  Elections  25  May  2003.  International 
Observer Guide, p. 9 
4 We should be aware that although the numbers reported are the most recent indicators of ethnic structure of 
Moldovan population, they correspond to the situation in 1989 and have little  in common with the current status. 
5 In 1940, after Soviet annexation, the Cyrillic script was introduced and the language was referred to as Moldavian 
up until 1989 when the Latin alphabet was reintroduced. 
6 2001 World Bank Development Indicators. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions 
The  main  religion  in  Moldova  is  Orthodox  Christianity.  It  counts  among  its  followers  up  to  90 
percent of the population. 
 
Moldova  was  one  of  the  first  Soviet  republics  to  have  a  strong  independence  movement.  
Similar to Baltic states a process of detachment from the Soviet Union and independent nation-
building started already in 1990. In June 1991, Moldova instituted its own citizenship. On August 
27 the Moldovan Parliament proclaimed independency of the Republic of Moldova. In December 
1991  Moldova  joined  CIS,  and  its  independence  was  recognized  by  Russia  and  international 
community.7 
In  1990  (i.e.,  one  year  before  Moldova  attained  a  full  independence),  in  face  of  overall 
liberalization,  increasingly overt  expressions of Moldovan  national  identity and ethnically  based 
emotions, the hard-line Communist leaders declared the creation of the Transnistrian Moldovan 
Soviet Socialist Republic on the eastern bank of the river Dniester. At the same time, the Gagauz 
minority announced the formation of its own republic in the south of the country. In May 1992 a full-
scale civil war erupted between Moldova and Transnistria Republic. Transnistrians supported by 
Russian forces attempted  to forcefully  take  over  the  west  bank  city  of  Bender.  The  short,  but 
intensive war was brought to an end through a cease-fire agreement in July 1992. Very soon an 
agreement was reached with the Gagauz minority according to which Gagauzia was granted far-
reaching autonomy within a framework of the Republic of Moldova. Unfortunately, little progress 
has been made since the cease-fire agreement to normalize relations between the Republic of 
Moldova and Transnistria Republic. After more than ten years following the conflict, a solution to 
the  problem  is  no  closer  than  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  case-fire.  Transnistria  Republic  is  not 
recognized by the international community, Russian troops are still present on the eastern bank of 
the Dniester river and there is lack of any political interest that would ensure Moldova’s sovereignty 
over its entire territory and extensive autonomy of Transnistria. Currently, Transnistria is viewed in 
Chisinau as a part of Moldova, but in fact this part of the territory is run as an independent state. 
Although,  as  already  mentioned  above,  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  separatist  forces  in 
Moldova  were  very  strong  (unification  with  Romania  or  closer  political  links  with  Russia  were 
considered), “there is also a strong sense of a specific Moldovan identity, particularly among the 
Romanian-speaking majority of the population, [...], which goes back to the 19
th century [...]”.8 This 
was confirmed in a vote in 1994 when the population expressed the desire that Moldova should 
remain an independent state. 
During the first decade of independence, Moldova has become a democracy with free and 
multiparty elections. It is the only country in CIS to have a parliamentary rather than presidential 
system  of  governance.  In  the  middle  of the  1990s  the country  was  considered as a  model  of 
sucessful  political  and economic  transformation.  However, already  at  the  end  of the  decade  it 
                                                 
7 Only Lithuania and Romania recognized independence of the Republic of Moldova after its own declaration of 
independence in August 1991. 
8 Ronnas and Orlova (2000), p. 53. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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became  clear  that  Moldova  did  not  use  the  momentum  and  the  overall  social  and  economic 
outcomes are not as good as expected. Currently, the Republic of Moldova is viewed as one of the 
poorest and least developed countries in Europe. 
1.2. Political Background 
With the advent of glasnost and perestroika in the late 80s, informal political groups promoting 
national  and  cultural  renaissance  with  pro-Romanian  spirit  emerged.  On  31  August  1989  the 
Moldovan language was declared as a state language and the Cyrillic script was replaced by Latin 
alphabet. Two months later the First Secretary of Communist Party of Moldova (CPRM), an ethnic 
Russian,  was  replaced  by  ethnic  Moldovan,  Petro  Lucinschi.  The  Democratic  Movement  of 
Moldova,  later  renamed  Popular  Front  (PF),  became  the  main  pro-independence  movement. 
Although it was not allowed to participate in the 1990 elections for the Supreme Soviet of the 
Moldovan SSR, many pro-independence Moldovan politicians were elected, including activists of 
the PF. Parliament adopted the tree-colored official flag and removed Communist symbols. Some 
slogans to join Romania started appearing in Moldova.  
These acts triggered the political protests in Transnistria on the left bank of the Dniester river, 
with  a  large  share  of  ethnic  Russians  and  Ukrainians,  and  also  in  Gagauzia  in  the  south  of 
Moldova. In September 1990 Transnistria voted for autonomy in an unrecognized referendum. At 
the  same  time,  the  Gagauz,  a  Turkish-speaking  minority  of  Christian  Orthodox  denomination, 
announced the formation of its own republic in the south of the country.  
As mentioned in Section 1.1, unfortunately, little progress has been made since the cease-fire 
agreement  to  normalize  relations  between  the  Republic  of  Moldova  and  Transnistria  Republic 
despite of ten years of political negotiations under the OSCE patronage. In 1999 Russia agreed to 
withdraw  its  troops  from  Transnistria  by  2002.  In  2001  five-sided  talks  started  at  finding  an 
adequate solution to the Transnistrian conflict. A progress is rather minor. The first convoy caring 
munitions left in early October 2002 followed by further evacuations in the next months. However, 
Russia failed to meet original deadline of full demilitarization of Transnistria. 
In July 2001 the OSCE put forward a proposal for transformation of Moldova into a federal 
state that would include territory of both bank of Dniester river and have a common currency, 
customs, armed forces and Moldovan in Latin script as official language. Within the new state 
Transnistria  would  enjoy  the  status of  an  autonomous  region.  Despite of  criticism  of  the  plan, 
Moldova accepted a proposal as a chance for unification of the country. However, Transnistrian 
authorities  criticized  the  proposal,  preferring  the  establishment  of  a  confederation  in  which 
Republic of Moldova and Transnistria will be considered separate political entities. In March 2003 
president Voronin put forward a proposal for the preparation of new constitution of Moldova that 
should be accepted by referendum and would follow by elections of president and parliament on 
entire territory. The course of the debate raises doubts if it can bring a breakthrough.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions 
In sum, after more than ten years following the conflict, a solution to the problem is not  much 
closer  than  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  case-fire.  Transnistria  Republic  is  not  recognized  by  the 
international community, Russian troops are still present in Transnistria and there is lack of any 
political interest that would ensure Moldova’s sovereignty over its entire territory and extensive 
autonomy of Transnistria. 
Frozen conflict with Transnistria has impeded the process of building a fully independent state. 
Because of the conflict the country is open for external intervention and faces security problems. 
Although Transnistria is viewed in Chisinau as a part of Moldova, in fact this part of the territory is 
run as an independent state. Existence of the Moldovan Transnistrian Republic over  a decade led, 
in reality, to significant differentiation of political and economic systems on different sides of the 
Dniester.  The  Republic  of  Moldova  (RM)  has  made  some  impressive  steps  toward 
democratization, market economy and de-socialization of public life, and a rebirth of Romanian 
culture. At the same time, Transnistria has been ruled by semi-dictatorial government, maintaining 
the central role of the state in the economy and continuing to use the Soviet symbols, and Russian 
as the state language. Western governments, though, continue to stress the territorial integrity of 
Moldova and shy away from direct contact with the authorities of Transnistria. 
Internal conflict and strong pro-Russian orientation of Transnistrian authorities have impeded 
crystallization of vectors of the Moldovan politics. After a decade after the demise of the Soviet 
Union,  the  political  actors  of  the  Republic  of  Moldova  continue  to  situate  themselves  along  a 
spectrum ranging from supporters of some form of political union with Romania, to those in favor of 
independence, to those desiring some degree of reintegration with Russia and the former Soviet 
Republic. Controversies around Russian as a state language, the name of the official language 
(Moldovan or Romanian), dual citizenship and the content of school history textbooks returned on 
the political agenda after victory of Communists in 2001 elections. Only recently, the pro-Romanian 
attitude  has  been  transformed  into  a  strong  pro-European  approach  while  the  option  for  the 
Russian-Belarus  Union  has been slightly  mitigated.  Still, the  priorities of external orientation  of 
Moldova Republic are unclear as the ruling Communists simultaneously express willingness to join 
the  Russian-Belarus  Union,  Stability  Pact  for  South-Eastern  Europe  and  the  European  Union. 
Finally, despite the fact that the populations of Moldova and Transnistria suffer from the division of 
the country, some individuals and groups profit from it. All these factors complicate the current 
negotiations over re-integration of both part of the republic.  
1.3. Social Issues  
Citizens  of  Moldova  enjoy  a  relatively  high  level  of  education.  Literacy  among  the  adult 
population (people of 15 and above) is 99% (see Annex: Table 1) and the country has a system of 
universal free secondary education; there is also a developed network of universities (in recent 
years, the educational system in the country has been suffering from a lack of financial resources). 
Following national traditions of the peoples living in Moldova and as a Soviet legacy, the role of Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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women in public life is high. Women have free and equal access to education and jobs in public 
administration. At the same time, however, representation of women in the highest bodies of the 
executive and legislative powers is disproportionately low.  
Although Communist ideology was officially eliminated and the institutional framework inherited 
from the Soviet system has been gradually changed, the Soviet mentality is still present among 
ordinary citizens and state officials. The impact of the Soviet system is still visible in centralized 
structures  of  governing bodies, over-bureaucratization  of the  state apparatus,  low  legal  culture 
among both civil servants and citizens, and lack of respect of private ownership and individual 
rights. Corruption remains common among state officials, officers in law enforcement agencies and 
other public employees.9 
Since Moldova became an independent state in 1991, it has suffered from a deepening social 
crisis. The main elements of this crisis include: (i) enormous decline in income and growing income 
differentiation  (in  recent  years  income  inequality  has  increased  significantly,  in  2002  the  Gini 
coefficient of income inequality10 was equal to 0.406), (ii) growing poverty (in the year 2000 the 
share of the population with the income less than half of the subsistence minimum11 was about 
53.4 percent,  with 64  percent of  the poor  living  in  rural areas)12, and  (iii)  sharply deteriorating 
nutrition. Poverty is much higher in villages than in urban communities. At the same time, rural 
population  suffers,  to  greater  extent,  from  rapid  deterioration  of  the  Soviet-built  infrastructure 
(roads,  schools,  water  supply  systems,  etc.),  poor  social  services,  and  lack  of  market  for 
agriculture products. As mentioned by Ronnas and Orlova (2000) roots of this crisis come from low 
economic performance and as a result low wages and social payments13 (see Section 1.4). 
Low  wages  and  lack  of  perspectives  of  professional  development  lead  to  the  increase  of 
migration of the productive section of the population. According to Mosteaga and Muteanu (2003), 
there are more than 600 thousand people (1/3 of total labor force) working abroad. In 2002 the 
amount of remittances reached the level of about 250 million U.S. dollars (i.e., it was almost the 
same as the total salary fund of the Republic of Moldova).14  
The  United  Nations  Development  Program’s  (UNDP)  Human  Development  Report  ranks 
Moldova  in  the  group  of  Medium  Human  Development  countries  as  the  104th  out  of  the  173 
countries ranked (Human Development Index - the conventional international measure of country’s 
living standards - dropped from 0.720 in 1980 to 0.701 in 2000).15   
                                                 
9 According to evaluations by Transparency International (see Carasciuc, 2001), Moldova is placed in the group of 
countries with a high index of corruption (on a descending scale of 10 to 0 (with 0 representing a total corruption) 
Moldova scored 2.6 in 2000 (76
th place in the world).  
10  The  Gini  coefficient  measures  the  degree  of  inequality  (usually  income)  on  a  scale  from  0  to  1,  where  0 
represents perfect equality and 1 maximum inequality. 
11 207 lei in the year 2000.  
12 Moldova. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002. 
13 In 2001 the average salary was at the level of about 37.8 U.S. dollars (491 lei), and average monthly pension at 
the level of 7 U.S. dollars (91.7 lei). 
14 See Gorelova (2003). 
15 Moldova’s ranking is lower than all the Former Soviet Union economies, with the exception of Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions 
1.4. Economic Performance 
In the Soviet era central planning covered the whole national economy of the Moldavian SSR 
and, actually, this was the only regulatory mechanism. The system of economic management was 
a part of the Soviet command model. The Republic could work out its own plans only within the 
production targets and limits of resources approved by the all-Union authorities in Moscow. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union transformed virtually overnight Moldova from a small cogwheel in a 
giant economy, completely isolated from the outside of the world, into a small open economy and 
independent state. The economic shock resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union affected an 
economic position of the country through (i) the disruption of trade links and distribution channels 
(Moldova suddenly lost both its main source of inputs and its market for outputs), (ii) deterioration 
of  its  terms  of  trade  due  to  the  liberalization  of  the  price  of  energy  (a  key  and  fully  imported 
component of Moldova’s domestic costs), and, consequently, high costs of imports of energy and 
raw  materials  (Ronnas and Orlova,  2000).  The conflict  in Transnistria  in 1992  and  a  series  of 
natural  disasters  (floods  in  1992  and  1994)  harmed  economic  recovery.  Continuing  regional 
instability and, especially, the effects of the Russian crisis of 1998 also had a very negative impact 
on the development of the national economy. As a consequence, starting from independence each 
year (except 1997) negative economic growth was observed. In the year 1999 real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) reached only 29.9 percent of the level of the year 1990. Following the regional 
financial crisis in 1998, Moldova has made significant progress toward achieving and retaining 
macroeconomic and financial stabilization.16 It has implemented many structural and institutional 
reforms that are indispensable for efficient functioning of a market economy. The results of these 
efforts have helped maintain economic stability, enabled the resumption of economic growth, and 
contributed towards the creation of an environment that is conducive to the long-term economic 
growth.  For  the  past  three  years  economic  performance  has  been  positive,  benefiting  from 
favorable external factors, prudent fiscal and monetary policies, structural reforms in the agriculture 
and energy sectors. In particular, real GDP growth of 2.1 percent and 5.0 percent was observed in 
the years 2000 and 2001, respectively. At the same time, strong export growth and large inflows of 
workers’ remittances led to a significant improvement in the current account deficit (to 7.5 percent 
of GDP). These positive developments continued in 2002. Real GDP growth reached 5 percent, 
with inflation kept below 8 percent and small further improvement in the current account .17  
Despite these efforts, and the recent resumption of economic growth, Moldova continues to 
have one of the lowest levels of income per capita in Europe and lower than the average for CIS 
countries.In 2000, the nominal GDP per capita in U.S. dollars amounted to about 360 and GDP per 
capita adjusted for PPP18 per capita reached the level of 1916 U.S. dollars.19 Total GDP in current 
U.S. dollars in 2001 reached the level of 1.5 billion. At the same time, the underground economy in 
                                                 
16 See Moldova. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002 for details. 
17 Republic of Moldova. Staff Report for the 2002 Article IV Consultation ..., 2002 
18 PPP –Purchasing Power Parity 
19 Poverty Reduction, Growth and Debt Sustainability in Low-Income CIS Countries, IMF, World Bank, 2002 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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Moldova is believed to amount to about 50 percent of GDP. Moreover, in the last several years 
Moldova  has  become  one  of the  region’s  most  heavily  indebted  countries.  Total external  debt 
increased from virtually zero at the beginning of the 1990s to over 1.2 billion U.S. dollars (over 83 
percent of GDP) at  the  end of 2001.Additionally,  there  remain outstanding  external  arrears on 
energy imports to foreign suppliers estimated at 298 million U.S. dollars or about 20 percent of 
GDP. Furthermore, the privatization process slowed significantly in 2001.  
Although many basic policies aimed at economic development are in place, there is little active 
enforcement  of  laws  on  the  protection  of  private  property  and  the  freedom  to  engage  in 
entrepreneurial activity. As a result, the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Moldova is very 
low. In 2001, the cumulative inflow of FDI reached in 2001 the level of 420 million U.S. dollars 
(approximately the level of FDI flowing to Estonia each year).20 In 2001 the Index of Economic 
Freedom, developed by Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, placed Moldova in the 
category of “Mostly Unfree” as 105
th out of 155 countries . 
Thus, even though some indicators of economic recovery have been observed in the last three 
years, still a lot needs to be done in the area of economic development. In particular, Moldova 
lacks  sufficient  foreign  and  domestic  investment,  while  its  economy  still  remains  vulnerable  to 
external  shocks  (periodic  droughts  and  regional  financial  contagion),  and  the  country  faces 
financial problems associated with a large foreign debt service burden.  
2.  Development of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions  
in Moldova 
2.1. Institutional Development  
A sequence of events since 1991 determined the political development of Moldova. Lack of 
consensus on independence among all national minorities made consolidation of the Moldovan 
statehood difficult and left the process of democratization of the political system in a transitory 
stage.  The  presidency,  parliament,  system  of  central  and  local  government,  administrative 
structure and electoral code have all been subject to many changes over the last decade in a 
campaign mode. Although the country adopted a new constitution in 1994 and has gone through 
three cycles of free elections to various level of national and local government, Moldova is still 
viewed as a weak state with weak governmental institutions.  
The  1994  Constitution  provided  for  separation  of  the  executive,  legislative  and  judicial 
branches of government. However, locus of power in the Moldovan political system has long been 
characterized by tension between the legislature and the executive. President Lucinschi tried to 
transform Moldova into a presidential republic in 2000. However, he failed to get the support of the 
Parliament. Instead, the Parliament amended the constitution on July 5, 2000, strengthening the 
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powers of the legislative and abolishing direct presidential elections. Elected by the Parliament, the 
President nominates the Prime Minister, based on the distribution of party power in the Parliament.  
Paradoxically  enough,  constitutional  amendments  combined  with  the  outcome  of  February 
2001 parliamentary elections brought a major change in the balance of power toward presidency. 
The Communists secured 71 of 101 seats in the legislative (a constitutional majority) and elected 
their party leader, Vladimir Voronin as President of Moldova. Having control of both the executive 
and legislative branches, the CPRM also became a dominant political force at the local level as a 
result of 2003 local elections. Although the last elections reveal some limits to their ability for full 
control over the Moldovan politics, shortcomings observed during the campaign remain a source of 
concerns. Most importantly, there are few real checks and balances in the new political system.21 It 
raises concerns that a consolidation of democracy in Moldova could come under threat. 
Political  changes  of  2001  affected  also  the  structure  of  local  government,  which  was 
introduced by the 1999 administrative reform. In March 2003 the ten regions (judets) were replaced 
by  33  districts  (rayons),  as  they  had  existed  in  the  Soviet  times  up  to  1999.  In  addition,  the 
municipality of Chisinau and Gagauzia autonomous region remained separate units. Furthermore, 
the  number  of  municipalities  and  communes  rose  from  644  to  907,  again  reversing  the  1999 
reform. These amendments to the law on local administration have been interpreted as a sign of 
perpetual  efforts  of  Communists  to  set  up  a  vertical  power  structure.  Moreover,  the  electoral 
campaign  has  been  qualified  by  many  analysts  and  observers  as  the  dirtiest  one  since 
independence. A significant number of observers voiced concerns about abuse of power by the 
ruling party and bias in the media in favor of government.  
Over  the  past  decade  Moldova  has  had  a  good  record  with  regards  to  national  elections. 
Despite some shortcomings, elections were labeled as "free and fair" by OSCE/ODIHR standards. 
The main legal basis for the conduct elections and referenda is the electoral code, adopted in 
November 1997 and amended several times afterwards. The amendments, which were passed in 
2001, raised the threshold to 6 percent for parties, 9 percent for coalitions of two parties, and 12 
percent for a coalition of three or more parties. In effect, only three parties managed to clear the 
threshold and got parliamentary mandates. Almost one third of the votes cast were lost under 
those conditions.  
However, the most important problem stems from the fact that Moldova's electoral system has 
discouraged the  creation  of  strong  and  stable  parties  linked to  clear  constituencies.  Moldova’s 
proportional representation system has functioned on the basis of a closed party list ballot, with the 
entire country considered a single electoral district. This creates few incentives for parties to reach 
out to distinct constituencies, or for politicians, once elected to feel a sense of obligation towards 
the voters who put them in office22. Calls for the introduction of a mixed electoral system that would 
incorporate some single member constituencies into the present system of party voting have failed 
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to be implemented23. Communists benefit from the present system of party-voting lists and are not 
interested in electoral reform.  
Under the current legislation the process of the registration of a political party in Moldova is 
rather  simple  (new  parties  should  collect 5000 signatures  of  supporters).  Currently  26  political 
parties are registered by Ministry of Justice and are entitled to participate in elections in 2003. 
However, it must be noted that in November 2002 the Communists tried to raise the threshold for 
the registration of political parties from 5000 to 15000 members but they failed to get parliamentary 
support for the proposal.  
Since 1991 Moldova has established a judicial system and a basic legislative framework for 
justice  administration.  The  Constitutional  Court  is  actively  involved  in  examining  petitions  from 
state  and  judicial  bodies.  The  Supreme  Court  periodically  issues  interpretations  of  current 
legislation by courts. The criminal code was amended in 2001 in a progressive manner. Moldovan 
legislation guarantees human rights for all the citizens, but enforcement of law is still a problem, 
especially  in  Transnistria.  Finally,  despite  a    reluctant  implementation  of  Council  of  Europe 
agreement, the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church was added to the official registry of religious 
denominations in July 2002.  
To sum up, Moldova has made an impressive progress in adoption of democratic standards of 
legislation and rule of law. Implementation of some part of legislation still raises concern, though. 
The achievements of the decade of transition to democracy are mainly hampered by inefficient 
administration,  lack  of  adequate  financing  of  public  bodies,  poverty,  territorial  separatism  and 
corruption of state officials. However, it should be underlined that in spite of serious political and 
constitutional crises, the political system of the country works and is kept largely on democratic 
track.  
2.2. Civil Society Organizations  
Political parties 
The Moldovan party system has been characterized by instability and fragmentation, especially 
in the center. Parties change their names, split, merge, and form short-lived personal and political 
alliances.  Some  parties  won  elections  only  to  fail  to  return  to  parliament  the  next  time.  The 
exemplary case is the Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova (ADPM), which from more than 43 
percent in 1994 fell to 3.6 percent in 1998 and has since been of negligible importance. Moreover, 
a change of the political landscape after every cycle of elections has been a standard phenomenon 
(see Annex, Table 2). 
 
Despite a shifting party landscape, we can agree with the diagnosis, provided by Charles King, 
that three main blocs of parties have remained largely as they were at the time of independence:  
                                                 
23 East European Constitutional Review, Vol 11-12, Fall 2002 and Winter 2003, p. 35. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions 
(i)  pro-Romanian  block  supported  by  intelligentsia  and  Moldovans  who  benefited  from 
reforms of early 90s;  
(ii)  a  vast  centrist  block  committed  to  maintaining  their  position  of  power  within  the 
privatized agricultural and agro-industrial sector and motivated more by patronage than 
ideology; 
(iii)  resurgent left, composed both of dissatisfied ethnic minorities hard hit by the post-1989 
cultural changes and increasing number of Moldovans dissatisfied with decline of living 
standards caused by economic transition and political infighting24. 
It  needs  to  be  recognized,  however,  that  the  relations  between  these  blocks  have  been 
changing over decade.  
In the early 1990s the most vivid part of political spectrum was the pro-Romanian bloc with 
National Front (NF) as its core. The NF called for democratization, national revival, privatization 
and  unification  with  Romania.  Dissolution  of  the  NF  after  independence  gave  birth  to  several 
parties  (Christian  Democratic People's  Party  (CDPP),  National  Liberal  Party  and other). At  the 
same time, the popular support for all of them decreased almost threefold. Since 1994 elections 
they have all together received around 10 percent of cast votes. The opposite side of the spectrum 
was  occupied  by  the  strongly  pro-Soviet/pro-Russian  "Interfront"  and  other  pro-Communist 
groupings stemming from banned Communist Party. Between these two movements the Social 
Democratic Party was located. 
Since the 1994 parliamentary elections the Moldovan political scene was dominated by a large 
moderate  party  of  the  former  nomenclatura  members  (ADPM),  accompanied  by  the  radical 
Socialist  Party  and  moderate  parties  of  both  sides  of  the  cultural  cleavage  (i.e.,  the  Union  of 
Democratic Forces). Battles over privatisation as well as presidential ambitions of ex-Communist 
leaders like Snegur and Lucinschi gave way to the decline of the ADPM and appearance of new 
parties formed around some ambitious leaders (Party of Reconciliation and Rebirth, Movement For 
Democratic and Prosperous Moldova, Democratic Party). Common economic and political interests 
of  competing factions  rather than  party names or  doctrines defined perpetual  reshaping  of  the 
center of the party spectrum. This tendency continued after the 1998 parliamentary elections when 
several center-right parties launched an uneasy pro-reform coalition to counter the Communists 
and  to  accelerate  economic  transformation.  However,  these  parties  failed  to  secure  a 
parliamentary majority for the reform government for a longer period. At the same time, non-ethnic 
questions of economic reforms and social burden of transition tended to dominate the agenda. It 
explains why the Christian Democratic Popular Party — which previously had been the most anti-
Communist of all the factions — joined the leftists in supporting Sturza’s ouster in November 1999. 
This case clearly shows an erosion of politicization
25 of Moldovan politics in the late 1990s resulting 
in the lack of clear messages for electorate. Shifting political alliances, muddling through, lack of 
defined party visions of reforms, cronyism, and sometimes corruption - all of these factors paved 
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the way for the Communist victory. Attempts to build a united center-right electoral block were 
undertaken too late and failed just before elections of 2001.  
In parallel, the Communist Party (CPRM) has firmly established itself as a dominant political 
force on the left. CPRM became the biggest parliamentary party in 1998, and afterwards went on 
to win an outright majority of the vote in 2001, followed by almost a half of the votes cast won in 
local election 2003.  
We have  to note, however,  that  the  Communists  did  not fulfill  their  populist  promises  and 
avoided a large-scale reversal of reforms. The same refers to the political sphere. Although certain 
moves by the Communist government were highly contentious (media, attitude toward opposition), 
simultaneous efforts of the opposition and international community forced the government to stick 
to democratic standards. 
Finally, the Braghish Alliance Electoral Block, which was transformed into Our Moldova Block 
(OMB) in 2003, functions as a loose coalition of center-left pragmatic politicians and smaller party 
groups of similar image. This grouping would, in reality, be a new hub of crystallization of the 
centre. Some prerequisites for fulfilling such a mission are noticeable. OMB managed to break out 
of the ethnic cleavage of the left (Russian-speaking urban intelligentsia) and to attract a part of the 
pro-Romanian urban and rural intelligentsia. However, the leaders of the Block have shown little 
capacity to meet this opportunity so far. Two smaller parties with prospect for future existence, 
namely the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) as well as PSL-PSD coalition seem to be less 
important from this point of view.  
Thus, in the light of the above, after a decade of independence the Moldovan party system 
consists of three components as it did at the beginning of decade. However, time and experience 
have  made  some  difference.  All  of  the  parties  are  currently  on  a  way  forward  that  requires 
transcending the cleavage of ethnic identity policy which gave birth to all of them.  
Non-governmental organizations 
Prior to the declaration of independence in 1991, some informal organizations were formed in 
the Moldavian SSR, which later predominantly joined the Democratic Movement of Moldavia for 
Perestroika, later renamed the Popular Front (PF). Disarray of the PF after independence gave 
birth to some political parties and youth organizations affiliated to them. The most important ones 
included Christian Democratic Popular Party and Christian Democratic Youth Union. Other political 
parties also tried to establish similar organizations (of youth, women etc.) in different time periods 
and  with  rather  minor  success.  An exception  can be the  Communist  Party  of  Moldova  (CPM), 
established in 1993, that managed to transform the Union of the Youth (the former Komsomol) into 
the new Komsomol, which collaborates strongly with the CPM. It claims to have 4000 members. 
Organizations of this kind are perceived as part of the political landscape rather than a subdivision 
of the NGO sector as such. However, about 16 percent of existing NGOs collaborate with political 
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Basically, the NGO sector is composed of the following three segments:  
I.  The  first  group  represents  social  organizations  inherited  from  Soviet  times  like:  (i) 
cultural associations of free professionals (unions of writers, composers, journalists); (ii) 
organizations of social sector (Unions of Pensioners, Veterans of War and Work etc.); 
(iii) gender ones (unions of women, youth); (iv) advocacy (i.e. Associations of Victims of 
Chernobyl); (v) ethnic minority associations; and (vi) sport and leisure unions and clubs. 
In  most  cases  organizations  of  this  group  managed  to  maintain  material  base  and 
develop infrastructure and were supported financially by the state budget means. That 
created favorable conditions for their activities at the beginning of transition. It is worth 
mentioning that some of them, especially cultural organizations, were very active in the 
initial  period  of  systemic  changes  (unions  of  writers,  journalists,  educational 
organizations etc.). However, only a few of them were able to transform into free and 
democratic associations (i.e. Union of Journalists). Others continue to act in the old 
manner  and  face  growing  difficulties  to  meet  their  objectives  in  the  changing 
environment (it refers particularly to old social sphere organizations). Drying support 
from the state budget, on the one hand, and deterioration of living conditions of large 
part of population, on the other hand, make their mission not an easy task. At the same 
time  they  are  reportedly  less  prepared/fortunate  to  get  grants  from  the  tenders 
announced by international donors. For these reasons organizations of this group tend 
to support ruling parties of any political configurations. The number of old organizations 
is decreasing and amounts to about 100. A separate place among them is occupied by 
the old trade unions, which are excluded from our analysis. 
 
II.  The  second  group  of  NGOs  consists  of  new  organizations  that  were  created  after 
independence in order to solve some social problems or to promote new ideas and 
group interests. First human rights groups, ecological organizations, students' leagues, 
associations of civic education and new organizations of youth appeared in 1992-1995. 
Many of them arose spontaneously around single leaders whereas their structures were 
far from being developed. However, after some period, they were able to get support 
from international donors (Soros Foundation, World Bank and others) that helped them 
to grow. Donors' support has been crucial for the recognition of the NGO sector by 
public  structures.  The  years  from  1995  to  1997  marked  a  turn  in  the  process  of 
institutionalization of NGOs in Moldova. The adoption of the Law on Public Association 
in 1996 and a subsequent re-registration of existing organizations in conformity with 
new  legislation  helped  create  favorable  conditions  for  founding  democratic 
organizations. Since 1998 the process of mushrooming of new NGOs has been visible. 
The main motives underlying this process included: success stories of the forerunners, 
more  developed  structures  of  resource  centers,  easier  access  to  information  about 
grants opportunities, personal ambitions to leadership, looking for alternative ways of Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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solving acute social problems and finding attractive work, non-limited and concrete at 
the same time are the most frequent explanations for the reasons for involvement. The 
main financial source of the NGOs in Moldova come from the grants offered by external 
donors. 
The end of the 1990s witnessed new tendencies in the development of Moldovan 
NGOs  belonging  to  this  group.  Firstly,  NGOs  extended  their  activities  to  some  new 
fields  (think  tanks,  regional  development,  prevention  of  trafficking  in  women,  public 
administration  etc.).  Secondly,  Moldovan  NGOs  were  able  to form  coalitions for  the 
promotion of interests regarding human rights, combating torture, advocacy actions and 
environment.  Thirdly,  a  network  of  resource  centers  for  NGOs  has  been  created 
offering a range of training, consulting, information services and technical assistance. 
The centers work on the national level and local level, delivering support to the entire 
sector  (CONTACT)  or  serving  as  resource  centers  in  particular fields:  human  rights 
(CREDO),  mass-media  organizations  (Center  for  Independent  Journalism),  women's 
movements (National Center of Studies and Information on the Women's Problems), 
Center PILIGRIM-Demo as resource center for the association from the Transnistria 
region.  The  National  Youth  Council,  SIEDO  and  ADEPT  can  be  classified  as 
organizations of intermediary support.26 Fourthly, a new form of popularization of its 
achievements appeared: the Forum of NGOs, a bi-annual meeting of representatives of 
all fields of their activities. Exchange experience, meeting with donors, the media and 
discussions on future forms of activity of the movement are the focus of  their concern. 
However,  implementation  of  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Forums  is  still  far  from 
being satisfactory and results in some controversies on the agenda for the meeting. 
Finally, a new wave of establishing of grass-root organizations in rural communities is 
observed. It was triggered by the adoption of National Strategy of Poverty Reduction 
and the programs of rural and regional development financed by World Bank, TACIS 
and other donors. These strategies stipulate the collaboration between NGOs and local 
authorities to solve a number of local problems. 
 
III.  “Governmental” NGOs (GONGOs) - an alternative to the independent organizations, 
established after 2001 (i.e., after the Communist Party took power in Moldova). Their 
mission seems to be the imitation of the opinion of genuine NGOs in some areas, which 
are  particularly  sensitive  to  the  government  (e.g.  media)  or  participation  in  the 
organizations, where presence of NGOs is specified by law.  
 
It needs to be mentioned, however, that independent NGOs try to build coalitions based on 
common values and interests to prevent deterioration of democratic standards, institutions and 
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practices. Coalition initiated by the Independent Center of Journalism against the antidemocratic 
abuses of freedom of media by authorities can be quoted as an example of such activity. The most 
recent  evidence of establishing  coalition for  promoting democratic  values  was the  activity  of a 
number of NGOs during the 2003 local elections in Moldova. The League for Defense of Human 
Rights in Moldova (LADOM) recruited, trained and accredited about 2,000 observers while the 
Helsinki Committee and a few other civil society organizations deployed a handful of observers on 
election  days.  The  Association for  Participatory  Democracy  (ADEPT)  produced  civic  education 
materials for these elections and The Association for Civic and Political Culture provided the public 
with a critical analysis of the electoral process. Experience gained in the course of the electoral 
campaign has become a starting point for a heated debate for creating the NGO coalition, For 
Democracy and Human Rights. Civic education, advocacy actions for changing an electoral law, 
assessment of functioning of democratic institutions, observation of human rights and searching of 
methods that would increase participation of youth in political life are at the center of the debate. 
Coming Forum of NGOs in September is expected to elaborate a strategy for the coalition. 
 According to the latest “Study on the Development of Non-Governmental Organizations in the 
Republic  of  Moldova”  at  the  end  of  2001  there  were  2758  NGOs  registered  in  Moldova.  
Possibilities for setting up NGOs in Transnistria have been rather limited. Nevertheless, about 300 
NGOs have been registered in Transnistria recently under the specific Transnistrian legislation on 
public associations.  
In both cases, i.e., in Moldova and in Transnistria, the real number of NGOs is much smaller. The 
study  of  the  sector  undertaken  by  the  National  Assistance  and  Information  Center  for  NGOs  in 
Moldova  CONTACT  indicated  that  only  1770  organizations  out  of  the  total  number  of  2758 
organizations registered exist. Moreover, large part of these organizations is not active (did not perform 
any action during the last two years). The estimations of the exact number of active NGOs differ. While 
CONTACT suggests that not more than 30-50 percent (i.e., 500 -900) of all NGOs really work, UNDP 
Human  Development  Report  2002  estimates  that  there  are  only  270  active  NGOs  in  Moldova. 
Moreover, in the case of those that are active, it is not always clear what programs they undertake, 
what finances are available to them, how transparent they are, etc.  
The study of NGOs in Moldova undertaken by the National Assistance and Information Center for 
NGOs in Moldova CONTACT identified about 65 percent of NGOs on the national level and about 35 
percent on the local level. Most national NGOs are located in urban areas (99 percent), especially in 
Chisinau (98 percent). Similarly the majority of local NGOs is situated in urban areas (66 percent). The 
majority of NGOs is constituted as public organizations (91 percent), and only 4 percent as institutions, 
3 percent as foundations and 2 percent as public movements.27 The most popular areas of interest 
include: education and research (26 percent), health (11 percent), culture, art and entertainment (10 
percent), and sport (10 percent). The breakdown of Moldovan NGOs by the principal field of activity is 
presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Breakdown of Moldovan NGOs by the principal field of activity28 
Main beneficiaries of Moldovan NGOs include: youth and children (23 percent), community 
residents (20 percent) and socially vulnerable groups (15 percent).  The breakdown of Moldovan 
NGOs by target groups is presented in Figure 2. 
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To Figure 2. Break down of Moldovan NGOs by target groups29 
To  summarize,  there  are  three  groups  of  NGOs  in  Moldova.  Each  group  has  a  different 
historical  development  path,  sources  of  finance  and  motivation  for  undertaking  activities. 
Nevertheless, NGOs in the Republic of Moldova cover practically all fields of activity. Although the 
exact number of NGOs in the country can be a subject of discussion, there is no doubt that the 
quantitative evolution of the non-governmental sector in Moldova has a tendency to grow (in the 
period 1997-2001, compared to 1992-1996 the number of NGOs grew twofold and a half) and 
develop (especially after the adoption in 1996 of the Law on Public Association).  
3.  Features of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions  
in Moldova  
3.1.  Participation of youth in civic life  
Difficult  socio-economic  situation  of  the  country  creates  serious  disincentives  to  effective 
engagement of the Moldovan youth in public life. The educated urban youth is minimally interested 
in  non-profit  civic  activity,  which  is  not  perceived  as  a  prestigious  enough  component  of  their 
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career.  Students  and  young  professionals  constitute  a  group,  which  suffers  from  confusion, 
frustration  and  cynicism  while  assessing  their  long-term  career  prospects  in  the  country,  and 
prefers to adopt a short-term perspective of personal utility and survival. This relative disinterest in 
social activism also has economic grounds. Students often receive substantial remittances from 
their parents working abroad which are spent on conspicuous consumption. After graduation only 
those with the right origin and connections may be assured of employment in the country, while 
most are likely to emigrate for work. The harsh conditions of country life and bleak prospects of 
local employment make the rural youth even more vulnerable to the 'brain drain' of migration to the 
capital city and living off their parents' money or of emigration in search of a job abroad. The 
majority of those who stay in the rural areas in turn lack the necessary educational and financial 
resources to engage in civic activity.  
Those young people who nonetheless were willing to be active were bound to be disillusioned 
by the youth organizations which either continued into the 1990s from the Soviet period or were in 
the process of establishment in the first part of the decade.  One of the leaders of the modern 
youth movement openly accuses those organizations of 'forgetting' the youth and its real interests 
through  their  paternalism,  conservatism  and  opportunism.  He  blames  the  institutions  which 
dominated the Moldovan youth scene prior to 1998 for compounding the disillusionment with public 
activity, which induced emigration or passivity. 
The  development  of  the national  youth  organizations  proceeded  in  two  phases,  which  are 
separated by the reforms to the organization of the National Youth Council in 1998, resulting from 
greater  involvement  of  international  agencies,  in  particular  the  Council  of  Europe.  The 
organizations which dominated the scene in the first period could be divided into holdovers from 
the Communist period, on the one hand, and new student and youth party organizations, on the 
other. The post-Soviet institutions retained older conservative leaders who lacked conviction about 
the abilities of the youth to generate ideas, manage activities, time and money. They limited the 
activities  to  a  narrow  range,  concentrating  on  sports  events,  art  exhibitions  and  cultural 
performances. The organizations catered to the select few, providing recognition to the children of 
rich parents who could make financial contributions.   
The youth associations emerging in the early 1990s at universities and political parties did not 
help  to  develop  civic  activism,  either.  Student  organizations  were  built  around  unelected,  self-
appointed leaders, bent on creating personal networks for purposes of fast career development. 
Not surprisingly their leaderships could not demonstrate commitment to any specific and constant 
set  of  values  and  were  passive  in  generating  strategic  ideas.  Another  reason  why  the  youth 
organizations were not perceived as representative of young people's interests was their lack of 
political  independence.  Political  parties  treated  affiliated  youth  organizations  as  vote  and 
membership  generators  and  allegations  were  made  of  the  infiltration  of  the  ranks  of  student 
organizations by state security apparatus. Finally, the organizations did not represent the majority 
of the youth, which lived in rural areas, as they were located almost exclusively in Chisinau and 
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International agencies, such as Council of Europe, UNICEF, the representations of Western 
governments  (embassies)  and  charities  (e.g.  Save  the  Children)  have  played  a  key  role  in 
reforming the youth movement, which accounts for greater activism of the youth in general, and the 
rural and marginal groups, in particular. At present nearly a quarter of the beneficiaries of non-
governmental sector in Moldova are children and teenagers.   
The crucial element for the success has been realization on part of donors of what mistakes 
were made. Earlier the donors simply placed structures tested abroad on the local unreformed 
leaders, accepted their empty mission statements at face value and concentrated on building the 
skills  of  the  local  leadership  without  verifying  the  contact  of  these  organizations  with  the  local 
youth.  Upon  realizing  that  the  investment  into  organizational  development  did  not  yield  a 
measurable expansion of civic activity, the international actors stimulated internal change in the 
umbrella  organization  of  Moldovan  youth  NGOs,  the  National  Youth  Council.  Of  particular 
importance was the conditionality of assistance upon demonstrable activity with the wider youth 
and stress on process of writing good proposals. Some internal factors were crucial, on the other 
hand, for giving the network independence from political pressures. On the one hand, the new Law 
on  Association  no  longer  permitted  registering  political  parties  as  NGOs,  forcing  all  the  youth 
parties to leave the Council. On the other hand, the network attracted a strong leader who had 
earlier demonstrated his serious commitment to quality by leaving the Council when it did not meet 
the standards.   
Currently 37 organizations, stimulating youth activism in various fields, are members of the 
reorganized National Youth Council. A measure of progress is the fact that seven organizations 
had to leave the Council when they could not demonstrate activity in the field.  Other signs of 
qualitative progress toward developing a healthier sector include: 
·  learning the standards through observation and horizontal contacts with similar 
structures, 
·  external  and  mutual  monitoring  (from  the  Council  of  Europe  and  inside  the 
National Youth Council), 
·  expansion into the countryside, 
·  opening  up  the  resources  to  non-institutional  actors  (resource  centers,  youth 
initiatives), 
·  stress on electoral process and transparency, 
·  maintaining cooperation with the Transnistrian NGOs and publishing their work. 
But many problems remain. It must be noted, nonetheless, that the youth organization sector is 
vibrant  enough  to  address  some  of  these  issues  on  its  own,  as  the  following  initiatives 
demonstrate. 
European Youth Exchange Moldova and the Center for Documentation and Information on 
Children's Rights have worked within the project "Youth participation in local administration" on two 
components of civic education. First, in collaboration with the Ministry for Youth and Sports, the 
two  organizations  have  offered  trainings  in  children's  rights  to  social  workers  in  local Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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administration. Second, they have placed consultants in regional youth NGO resource centers to 
assist emerging  youth  leaders of  local  initiatives.30    Through establishment  of  youth  initiatives, 
which do not require official registration but are democratically set up and governed, youth leaders 
may  learn  the  electoral  process  by  doing  it.  Four  sessions  of  the  Children's  Parliament,  each 
involving 110 participants, have also been held in Chisinau, bringing together representatives from 
the entire country to identify the priorities for actions for the local and national administration and 
the NGO sector. Apart from education and sports, child rights were prominent. For the 15 percent 
of active youth leaders, trainings are open when they turn 18 on how to train other leaders and how 
to establish their own NGOs. 
Other organizations specialize in trainings in civic rights and conflict resolution. For instance, 
Center for Associative Democracy ADEPT conducts trainings on democratic procedures for the 
party-affiliated  youth  organizations.  Youth  Helsinki  Citizens'  Assembly  provides  space  for  the 
dialogue  of  the  youth from both  sides of  the  Dniester  in  its  journal  "Collage,"  where particular 
emphasis is placed on the value of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. It is noteworthy that the 
journal is fully trilingual, running parallel sections in English, Romanian and Russian. 
Young people are a key audience for the practical human rights education available at LADOM 
(League for Defense of Human Rights), which was founded on local initiative in 1996.  Young 
people have been mobilized as election observers and as many as 2000 persons watched the last 
local elections thanks to the support of Soros Foundation and U.S. Embassy.  Around one hundred 
volunteers support the center, with the prominent participation of law students, who serve as legal 
consultants for the marginal groups, such as the refugees or victims of trafficking.  
3.2.  Public awareness campaigns and human rights  
If youth sector has managed to broaden the appeal of civic education and popularize human 
rights, the organizations working on these issues have recorded a relatively small impact on the 
wider public in Moldova for two reasons. First, little public support can be rallied for civic rights due 
to the general passivity and lack of confidence in influencing the authorities.  Second, the position 
of the NGOs vis-à-vis the administration is precarious, and intimidation of individual activists and of 
the entire organizations effectively limits the appeal of open criticism of human rights record of the 
government  to  the  few  professional  organizations  whose  plight  is  closely  monitored  by  their 
Western audience. As a result, the non-governmental sector's activities in the field of human rights 
are restricted to publishing the information on the situation in human rights in Moldova for foreign 
audiences. Human rights organizations are not growing, and remain oriented towards Western and 
not national audience.  
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There is a generally low level of confidence in the Moldovan society in the ability of non-elites 
to take effective part in public life. Analyzing the results of the Public Opinion Barometer as of 
November 2001 and March 2002, we can notice that to the question “How do you think people like 
you  can  influence  important  decisions  made  at  local  level  in  your  community?”  the  majority 
answered “to a small extent, very small extent/not at all” (cumulated 72 percent of respondents in 
November  2001  and  74  percent  of  respondents  in  2002).  The  level  of  confidence  tends  to 
decrease over  time,  as the  answers  “to a  small  extent”  are  now  replaced  by  “to  a  very  small 
extent/not  at  all”  (53  versus  39  percent).  Similarly  low  levels  of  confidence  are  placed  on 
influencing "important decisions made at national level?” where the cumulated answer “to a small 
extent, to a very small extent/not at all” in November 2001 and March 2002 constitutes 76 and 72 
percent, respectively. These results indicate that the civil society has much to accomplish in this 
respect. 
However,  NGOs  do  not  enjoy  sufficient  recognition  in  the  wider  public.  When  asked  the 
question “ How much confidence do you have in NGOs?” 46 percent respondents pointed to the 
lack of trust and 28 percent could not answer, compared to only 26 percent answers of ”some, a lot 
of confidence.”31 The mistrust toward non-governmental organizations is most pervasive in the 
rural  areas,  affecting  particularly  the  NGOs  working  with  local  government.  This  problem  was 
addressed by some NGO resource centers such as CONTACT, which quickly moved from building 
the  capacity  of  local  non-governmental  organizations  to  supporting  programs  of  community 
development. 
Civil society efforts at close cooperation with the local administration had to begin with lobbying 
for setting up and maintaining a decentralized and transparent system of governance.  Conditions 
of access to the legislative process of reform were dependent on the will of the authorities. The 
decentralization undertaken in 1997 was preceded, on the one hand, by a series of public debates 
and regional roundtables in which officials, members of the Moldovan Parliament, judges, local and 
central government representatives and NGO representatives took part. Discussions were held on 
draft laws of local administration and administrative territorial reform, producing proposals which 
could be then submitted to parliamentary committees. The initiative was coordinated by the Young 
Lawyers' Association of Moldova and National Agency for Local and Regional Development with 
the assistance from the Information and Documentation Center of the Council of Europe and the 
Eurasia Foundation. On the other hand, the current Communist government has been avoiding the 
scrutiny of civil society to its centralization program, refusing to discuss the costs and rationales for 
the reform. Angry attacks were made in the state-controlled press on the organizations (Viitorul, 
Institute  of  Public  Policy,  Soros  Foundation),  which  had  publicized  a  study  denying  the 
government's  claims  of  cost-free  character  of  the  reform.  Even  some  of  the  prominent  NGO 
leaders were intimidated by security service so that the report would not be made public. 
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One reason for which non-specialized general social organizations might not choose to pick up 
the issue of human rights in their activities is because they are intimidated.  One could quote the 
public announcement of the Minister of Justice, Mr. Ion Morei, who warned that public associations 
would be liquidated in case of involvement in politics. As this statement followed the critique of the 
Government's activity by some NGOs, it might be construed that a definition of 'political activities' 
could be interpreted quite liberally. 
Although about 12 percent of all NGOs reported engagement in human rights activities32, only 
several  specialized  organizations  are  actively  involved,  maintaining  their  positions  thanks  to 
organizational ties to international networks (Helsinki Committee) or to recognition as editors of 
reports (League for Defense of Human Rights Moldova). All conduct professional work in a narrow 
technical sense, maintaining small permanent staff and relying mainly on volunteers. However, in 
the context of the unresponsiveness of the government, they need to build a sustainable support 
and activate the community at large so as to overcome the mistrust of the society to the idea of 
human rights and to human rights NGOs in general. This could be achieved by supporting the 
growth of designated human rights organizations both in their numbers and their territorial and 
human resource base. 
As it will be seen in the case of freedom of media, it is impossible to register an openly human 
rights'  organization  in  Transnistria.  Members  of  civic  associations  willing  to  join  the  NGO 
assemblies in the Republic of Moldova are only able to do so by hiding their true purpose of visit. 
One leader of a Transnistrian NGO, which was engaged in dialogue with its Moldovan partners, 
was assaulted and battered for raising these issues.33 
3.3.  Freedom of media  
The  print  media  market  in  Moldova  is  very  politicized  for  two  reasons:  first,  because 
newspapers cannot support themselves financially without a political patronage and second, due to 
direct  forms  of  intimidation.  As  there  is  close  connection  between  business  and  government, 
opposition newspapers are not used for advertising. Newspapers therefore have to depend on 
political parties or are owned by businesspeople. This further undermines the independence of 
their views. 
A survey of 124 media organizations, undertaken in November 2002, indicates the perception 
of a high level of politicization in the ranks of the journalists. Only one percent of journalists believe 
that  the  field  is  not  politicized,  while  85  percent  strongly  disagree.  Top  reasons  given  for 
politicization of  the  media  in  the  eyes  of  the  journalists  themselves  are:  "precarious economic 
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condition  of newspapers"  (46  percent),  "lack of conditions for the  development of  independent 
media" (29 percent) and "lack of mechanisms for economic protection of journalists" (13 percent).34 
In the Republic of Moldova the current level of media consumption is not very high. Press 
circulation, especially in rural areas, is limited. There are even areas characterized by informational 
void, signaled by mass media (e.g. Ocnita sector), to which contributed the liquidation of the local 
cable  and  national  radio  broadcasting  stations.  The  press  reaches  a  small  fraction  of  the 
population.  Television  remains  the  preferred  media  type  for  61  percent,  followed  by  radio  (27 
percent) and the press (only 6.2 percent and another one percent favoring both the press and the 
other  outlet).  Half  of  all  the  respondents  watch  TV  daily,  while  only  about  10  percent  read 
newspapers every day. On the other hand, as many as 31 percent urban dwellers and 40 percent 
rural residents have not read a newspaper in the past three months, compared to 15 percent who 
have not watched domestic TV broadcast.35 
State-owned  television  and  radio  command  virtual  monopoly  on  the  news  provision  to  the 
population. Nearly a half of all the respondents (47.7 percent) pointed to the state TV news as their 
top  choice,  compared  to  5.4  percent  going  to  the  most  popular  independent  news  program 
(ProTV).  Independent  news  can  contest  the  state  broadcast  only  in  the  urban  areas  (where 
proportions are 11.3 percent to 35.1 percent, but not in the countryside where two independent 
station news have attracted one percent each, while the state TV is the top choice for over 57 
percent).  Overall,  TV  Moldova  and  the  Russian  ORT  have  been  chosen  as  customary  news 
sources by two-thirds of the viewers each. Independent Moldovan news is usually watched by 6.5 
to 12 percent of the population.36 
The state-owned electronic media are dominant nationally, and lack effective competition in 
rural areas. TV Moldova is available in nearly 79 percent of all Moldovan homes, while three most 
powerful local stations (NIT, ProTV, TV6 Balti) reach between 6.7 to 11.8 percent of the population. 
The difference is even greater in rural areas, where 82 percent of the population receives the state 
national TV, compared to 4.7 to 6 percent for the local stations.  These numbers may be compared 
to the coverage of the foreign state channels: the Russian ORT (75 percent nationwide and 70 
percent in the country) and TV Romania 1 (48 percent nationwide and 59 percent in the country).37   
High  licensing  and  maintenance  costs  for  independent  electronic  media  remain  significant 
obstacles to the development of independent stations. In August 2001 the licensing authority SCA 
warned around 40 holders of radio and TV broadcast licenses of their licenses being withdrawn in 
the event  of  not  paying  their  debts  to  SCA.  Also  due  to  debts  (about 300  000  MDL38  for  the 
technical license and over 50 000 MDL for the broadcast license) upon the court’s decision the TV 
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station  Catalan  TV ceased  to exist at  the end of  February.  The  revocation of  the  license  and 
closure  of  Catalan  TV  station  significantly  reduced  the  range  of  local  TV  stations,  especially 
because of the delay in launching new stations,  Stil TV and TV Municipal, while TVM broadcasts 6 
hours out of 24.39 
Lack of effective competition is a significant impediment to increasing the professional level of 
the  public  TV  journalists.  The  audience  have  difficulties  finding  professional  or  modern  native 
stations and rate them unfavorably when comparing them to the Russian or Romanian outlets. 
State TV and radio stations received the highest number of opinions of being "outdated", on the 
other hand.40 
Serious  debate  on  issues  of  public  interest  is  lacking  in  print  media  as  well.  Periodical 
publications print runs registered in 2001 are relatively low. The total annual print run of the 233 
existing newspapers amounted to 45 018 copies. 80 journals were published with a total annual 
print run of 1 982 thousand copies. On this market where many newspapers compete over a small 
pool of revenue and no leaders have emerged to dictate the standards of the trade, newspapers 
cater  to  relatively  unsophisticated  readers.  The  main  problem  is  the  size  of  the  market,  and 
consequently,  dependency  from  sponsors.  The  eclectic  tabloid  format  of  most  socio-political 
weeklies (which dominate the newspaper market), where serious news analyses are placed side 
by  side  with sensationalism,  indicates  that  they  aim at  recruiting as  many  readers as possible 
rather than serving a well-defined segment. 
However,  the  unwillingness  to  conduct  serious  debate  in  public  media  and  challenge  the 
politician’s statements has other reasons as well. Journalists resort to the self-censorship of their 
publications  for  fear  of  losing  their  jobs.  Situation  worsened  when  after  the  victory  of  the 
Communist party in 2001, the new government has tried to subordinate the media. The National 
Ethics Commission of the Journalists’ Union stated its concern about censorship, “which since the 
change of the political power became manifest at public TV and radio stations and government 
publications”.      In  particular,  the  Commission  decried  “the  dictatorial  politics  pursued  by  the 
governing  party  at  the  Teleradio  Moldova  state  company  –  by  means  of  personnel  dismissal, 
suspending certain broadcasts of political interest, by emphasizing the realities favorable only to 
this party, which leads to the indoctrination of society and to the suppression of political liberties.41 
Such  policies  are  unfortunately  left  unchecked.  The  government  may  afford  to  ignore  the 
critical reports of the Soros-sponsored Independent Center of Journalism by setting up its own 
trade  union,  Association  of  Professional  Journalists.  This  GONGO42  proved  its  loyalty  by 
abstaining from  condemning  the  negative  campaign  of  electoral  lies  or the attempts  at  closing 
down  the  independent  paper  Accente.  Unfortunately,  the  government  may  count  on  popular 
support for state intervention in the broadcasting content, mainly among the rural residents – 45 
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percent of rural respondents agree that "the state authorities must get involved in the editorial 
activity of media institutions," with 31 percent opposed.  It must be noted that the proportions are 
reversed  in  the  urban  areas,  but  the  demographic  balance  produces  41  percent  of  the  total 
population in favor of state intervention against 36 percent of those opposed.43 
Journalists  complain  of difficult  access  to  information,  as  stated  in  a  survey  carried  out  in 
September-October 2001 by the Center for the Promotion of the Freedom of Speech and Access 
to Information. According to this survey’s data the least transparent public issues include: use of 
the credits obtained from abroad (indicated by 46.2 percent of those questioned), corruption (77.9 
percent),  specific  use  of  budgetary  resources  (39.5  percent)  privatization  issues  and  public 
official’s  salaries  and  privileges.  According  to  48.1  percent  of  respondents  of  the  given 
questionnaire, they were denied access to the required information for no reason. 44 85 percent of 
journalists  surveyed  in  November  2002  were not  satisfied  with  the degree  of access  to public 
information, and a quarter of all respondents found the access to be "inadmissibly difficult." The 
overwhelming majority has encountered difficulties with the national government and its agencies 
or the Presidential office.45 
Public  authorities  also  take  active  part  in  distorting  the  contents  of  information.  Materials 
prepared by the presidential press center must by law be published by the media and failure to do 
so might initiate prosecution. In the course of the last local elections state-run mass media have 
blatantly favored the government candidates, while the president violated the pre-election silence 
by calling for voting against an opposition leader for the mayor of Chisinau. In response to the 
question “how do you think which institutions use mass media to manipulate the public opinion” 
82.6  percent  of  journalists  listed  in  this  category  political  parties,  mainly  during  the  election 
campaigns, while 32 percent of respondents believed that this was characteristic of authorities and 
public institutions in general.46  
Self-censorship of journalists' work may be attributed to the general anxiety about the stability 
of  their  jobs.  Most  common fears  include:  losing  employment and  government  intimidation. As 
many as 36 percent of journalists work without having a contract with their media outlet.  Cases of 
direct pressure and illegal state intervention have been recorded in the form of unlawful office 
searches or administrative orders to close down activity. The majority of the surveyed journalists 
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does not feel protected against persecution, threat or pressure as a result of their professional 
activity (60 percent "not at all", 35 percent "partially" and only 5 percent feels "fully protected.")47 
The problems cited in the context of the Republic of Moldova are incomparably more severe in 
Transnistria, which is a separate media market from that of the Republic of Moldova. The position 
of the media has been strongly influenced by the political evolution of the Republic of Transnistria. 
Transnistrian authorities were not able to monopolize the information market until 1995 as long as 
the commander of the Russian military on its territory, general Lebed, contested their activities in 
the  army  newspaper  and  TV  station  and  had  favorable  hearing  in  the  only  major  local  paper 
Dnestrovskaya Gazeta. Following the victory of president Smirnov's candidate in the local elections 
and Lebed's departure to Moscow, an attack on the alternative media was launched. The army 
paper Soldat Otechestva cut down its circulation dramatically and the editor of the Dnestrovskaya 
Gazeta was dismissed by the Tiraspol city council.48   
The  Transnistrian  media  scene  became  monopolized  by  the separatist authorities between 
1995-1997. The government and its ally, the trade unions, set up their own newspapers while the 
dominant state-related capital group Sheriff launched a network for broadcasting 20 TV channels, 
mainly  from  Russia.  In  the  situation  when  the  only  independent  TV  station,  ARM-TV,  stopped 
broadcasting in 2001 once the Russian government decided to discontinue funding, the authorities 
felt  free  to  stop  the  information  critical  to  the  power  group.  The  information  blockade  was 
particularly severe in the run-up to the presidential elections of December 2001. Foreign coverage 
critical to the government was taken off the air,49 and the newspaper representing the contending 
Party  of  People's  Power,  Glas  Truda,  was  boycotted  by  printing  houses  and  its  copies  were 
confiscated on the border so that it had to discontinue.  Attempts at closing down a successful 
independent  newspaper,  Novaya  Gazeta  (established  in  1998),  ranged from frequent  thorough 
examinations of its accounts through unlawful confiscations (including searches of the premises) to 
attempts  at  closing  the  paper  administratively.  Novaya  Gazeta  has  survived  as  the  only 
independent  socio-political  newspaper  circulated  throughout  Transnistria.  There  are  no 
independent broadcast media, though. 
3.4.  Think tanks 
There are only four think tanks in the country, all located in the capital of Chisinau, while there 
are none in the Transnistrian region.
50 They have been the most recent entrants onto the national 
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NGO stage. Three of them were formally established between 1999 and 2001 as either spin-offs or 
policy centers of international organizations or networks. The core founding teams of all the think 
tanks had established informal ties as members of projects to such international agencies and 
programs as UNDP, the World Bank, TACIS or Open Society Institute in mid-1990s. Some of the 
project  members  had  occupied  prominent  positions  in  the  government  or  academia  and  were 
interested in maintaining influence on the government policy after they left the administration or 
state  educational  institutions  due  to  political  turbulences.  Most  experts  continued  working  on 
projects involving close cooperation with the national government even in spite of lack of progress 
on substantive issues thanks to their personal idealist conviction of the general pro-European and 
pro-Western course of the governmental policy in late 1990s. 
The initiative for the formalization of policy institutes into permanent organizations came from 
both the donors and the experts who agreed on a need for truly national sources of advice to the 
government,  which  would  simultaneously be  independent  of  the authorities.  On  the one  hand, 
donors present in Moldova were considering creating spin-offs in the entire East European region, 
while the experts who had so far worked very closely with the government on development projects 
sought  a  greater  distance  from  the  authorities.  These  two  pathways  to  independence  can  be 
observed  in  the  origins  of  two  major  Moldovan  think  tanks.  Institute  of  Public  Policy  was 
established from scratch in 2000 following a strategic decision by the Open Society Institute to 
emulate a successful strategy of creating its affiliated policy centers. Center for Strategic Studies 
and Reform was formed in 2001 out of a team of experts working for UNDP since 1997. 
The  agenda  of  the  think  tanks  has  been  dependent  on  the  priorities  of  the  mother 
organizations as they remain essential sources of finance and institutional support in the early 
period of activity. In case of organizations built within a strong network, such as OSI, the priorities 
of  the  policy  center  (Institute for  Public  Policy),  were  laid  down  in  an  agreement between  the 
network officials and the head of the center, who was drawn from the network itself. The Institute 
received a significant initial lump-sum grant and was designated as a member of the powerful 
international network. This form of establishment gave the Institute the economic stability and a 
position of independence from the government at the start, which were necessary for attracting a 
set of external experts of prominence who would decide on a long-term cooperation. The Institute's 
agenda was limited, however, to three areas which were in agreement with the regional priorities of 
the network and were deemed by the representatives of the local Soros Foundation to be the areas 
where greatest impact could be made on the government. In effect, issues of European integration, 
managing internal conflicts (the Transnistrian case) and educational reform have remained key 
elements of the think tank's program. 
In  this  highly  partisan  political  environment,  think  tanks'  position  between  the  mistrustful 
government,  the  increasingly  distant  international  organizations  and  the  weak  civil  society  has 
been precarious. In the atmosphere of pervasive politicization of the public debate, the government 
attempted to label every independent think-tank as a tool of opposition or of foreign interests. The 
institutions were able to counter these allegations by adopting non-partisan, professional criteria for Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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the selection of project staff and by including ministry officials and experts into teams working on 
matters of state interest. In fact, cooperation in projects on foreign policy or internal and external 
security has developed over time so that one think tank leader (by no means sympathetic to the 
current  government)  could  conclude  that  the  Communist  cabinet  is  according  the  European 
integration or conflict resolution in Transnistria a higher priority than its predecessors. For instance, 
Institute  of  Public  Policy's  European  Integration  programs  have  attracted  the  experts  from  the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, Justice and the Border Guards. One way in which 
the  government  officials  have  been  persuaded  to  be  involved  in  sensitive  projects  was  the 
guarantee of their anonymity in the produced publications. Also helpful was the fact that some 
research staff of the think tanks came from the ranks of ministries, and the personal ties between 
the ministry insiders and outsiders have been retained. 
In  general,  the  relations  between  think  tanks  and  the  Communist  government  remain 
nevertheless ambivalent. Once it was installed in spring 2001, the new parliament and government 
administration found itself in need of in-depth analysis on the issues on which it was elected: the 
European  integration  and  the  solution  to  the  Transnistrian  conflict.  Instances  include:  the 
parliament's  request  for  all  available  research  on  the  Transnistrian  situation,  signing  a 
memorandum of understanding with Ministry of Defense on policy advice for the civil control over 
the  military  and  inclusion  of a  representative  of  a  think  tank  in  the  newly-established  National 
Commission  for  European  Integration.  At  the  same  time,  the  government  reacted  sharply  to 
criticisms of its policies in a heavy-handed manner. By issuing a joint critical statement on the 
centralizing tendencies and high budget costs of a local government reform, the members of a 
think-tank coalition became objects of internal investigation and even leaders of institutions in the 
Soros network were called to hearings. 
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
Almost ten years of rapid decline following independency has set Moldova back in terms of 
social and economic development. Even today production is far away from the level of the year 
1990. Although economically the period of independence has been very hard for Moldova, the 
country has made considerable efforts to reduce the omnipotence of the communist state and to 
define and implement basic functions of the democratic institutions. Significant progress has been 
achieved in preparation of the conditions for democracy. Moldova has made notable progress in 
the fields of the establishment of the rule of law and respect of human rights. Nevertheless, crucial 
problems in transforming public administration from a centralized bureaucracy into an efficient and 
performance-oriented organization still remain. The existing governance system still retains many 
features of the command style of management, which is inadequate for the market transformation, 
effectively hampering it. Political system is centralized in terms of decision-making, implementation 
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Non-governmental organizations  have been active  in  Moldova  since 1989, but  civil  society 
started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after 
the country became independent in 1991. Now the establishment of a transitional civil society is 
under way but this process is not smooth at all. 
Youth is minimally interested in non-profit civic activity, which is not perceived as a prestigious 
enough component of their career. Activities of youth organizations of the Soviet type focus on 
sports events, art exhibitions and cultural performances. Associations, which emerged after 1992, 
have  not  helped  to  develop  civic  activism,  either.  Finally,  organizations  of  both  types  do  not 
represent  the  majority  of  the  youth,  which  lives  in  rural  areas,  as  they  are  located  almost 
exclusively in Chisinau and other major cities. The most serious problems of youth movements in 
Moldova include: (i) a small number of the youth involved in setting up their own structures or 
activity and dominance of volunteer work, (ii) cynical, career-oriented, devoid of ideas character of 
youth party organizations, (iii) tendency by youth NGOs to stay clear of political debate and focus 
on  electoral  process,  (iv)  intimidation from  the  government  and  domination  of  older  leaders  in 
Transnistria, which keeps more daring ideas off the agenda. 
Human rights remain to be a problem in Moldova and especially in Transnistria. However, the 
organizations working on the area of human rights protection are recording relatively small impact 
on the wider public because of (i) the general passivity and lack of confidence in influencing the 
authorities, and (ii) insecure position of the NGOs vis-a-vis the administration, which effectively 
limits the appeal of open criticism of human rights record of the government to the few professional 
organizations whose plight is closely monitored by their Western audience). Most of active NGOs 
conduct  professional  work  in a  narrow  technical  sense,  maintaining  small permanent  staff  and 
relying mainly on volunteers. Moreover, in Transnistria, where human rights problems are more 
acute it is not possible to register a non-governmental organization openly aimed at human rights 
protection.  
Media market in Moldova is far from being free. Newspapers, due to the small size of the 
market, are highly dependent on sponsors or political parties and the number of copies is very 
limited. State-owned television and radio command virtual monopoly on the news provision to the 
population. The Communist government and public authorities take active part in distorting the 
contents of information (independent news can contest the state broadcast and news only in the 
urban areas). Journalists are uncertain about the stability of their jobs. Most of them do not feel 
protected against persecution, threat or pressure as a result of their professional activity. Situation 
in Transnistria, which has a separate media market from that of the Republic of Moldova, is much 
more difficult. The position of the media is strongly influenced by the local Communist regime. 
Media market is monopolized by the separatist authorities. Independent broadcast media do not 
exist in Transnistria, either. 
There are only four think tanks in the country. All of them are located in Chisinau - the capital 
of Moldova. Until the date no think tanks have been established in Transnistria. The existing think 
tanks are rather weak and most of them work for/with international organizations which are present Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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in Moldova (UNDP, the World Bank etc.). On the other hand, experience of other countries in 
transition shows that very soon one can expect of significant growth of organizations of this type 
and improvement of the quality of the services provided. 
To  summarize,  although  several  data  and  patterns  observed  indicate  progress  in  the 
development of non-governmental sector in Moldova, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., 
freedom of media or human rights protection) where certain regress has been observed in last two 
years.  Moreover,  the  situation of the non-governmental  sector  in  Transnistria  is far from  being 
satisfactory.  
Finally, we have to note that the critical socio-economic condition of the country seems to be 
the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in Moldova. This is because a further significant 
economic  decline  can  provide  fertile  ground  not  only  for  the  Communist  party,  as  it  was 
demonstrated  in  the  last  election,  but  for  more  non-democratic  political  forces  and  extremists. 
Economic  collapse  could  jeopardize  the achievements  in the  area  of democratization  and  civil 
society development. Thus, it needs to be recognized that only effects of a successful economic 
reform  process  may  reverse  undesirable  patterns  in  the  area  of  economic  development,  and 
change the socio-economic situation of Moldova, increase income of population, reduce poverty, 
guarantee  stability  and  irreversibility  of  Moldovan  achievements  in  democratization  and  the 
development of civil society.   Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions 
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Annex 
Table 1. The Republic of Moldova – Country Profile 
Moldova Data Profile  
  1997  2000  2001 
People  
Population, total   4.3 million   4.3 million   4.3 million  
Population growth (annual %)   -0.3   -0.2   -0.4  
National poverty rate (% of population)   23.3   ..   ..  
Life expectancy (years)   66.5   67.5   67.2  
Fertility rate (births per woman)   1.6   1.4   1.4  
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)   28.2   27.0   27.0  
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 children)   ..   33.0   32.0  
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)   99.1   ..   ..  
Child immunization, measles (% of under 12 mos)   99.0   87.0   81.0  
Prevalence of HIV (female, % ages 15-24)   ..   ..   0.1  
Illiteracy total (% age 15 and above)   1.5   1.1   1.0  
Illiteracy female (% of age 15 and above)   2.3   1.7   1.6  
Primary completion rate, total (% age group)   ..   ..   ..  
Primary completion rate, female (% age group)   ..   ..   ..  
Net primary enrollment (% relevant age group)   ..   78.4   ..  
Net secondary enrollment (% relevant age group)   ..   68.2   ..  
Environment  
Surface area (sq. km)   33,850.0   33,850.0   33,850.0  
Forests (1,000 sq. km)   ..   3,250.0   ..  
Deforestation (avearge annual % 1990-2000)   ..   -0.2   ..  
Water use (% of total resources)   ..   2,735.0   ..  
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)   2.5   ..   ..  
Access to improved water source (% of total pop.)   ..   92.0   ..  
Access to improved sanitation (% of urban pop.)   ..   100.0   ..  
Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent)   1,057.7   671.1   ..  
Electricity use per capita (kWh)   1,217.3   720.0   ..  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Moldova: Assessment of Civil Society and Democratic Institutions 
 
Economy  
GNI, Atlas method (current US$)   2.2 billion   1.4 billion   1.5 billion  
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)   590.0   400.0   400.0  
GDP (current $)   1.9 billion   1.3 billion   1.5 billion  
GDP growth (annual %)   1.6   2.1   6.1  
GDP implicit price deflator (annual % growth)   12.5   27.3   11.9  
Value added in agriculture (% of GDP)   30.2   29.0   26.0  
Value added in industry (% of GDP)   29.0   21.7   24.1  
Value added in services (% of GDP)   40.8   49.2   49.8  
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)   54.8   50.0   50.0  
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)   74.3   75.4   74.4  
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)   23.8   23.9   20.0  
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)   29.4   24.5   21.3  
Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP)   -7.6   -1.3   1.1  
Technology and infrastructure  
Fixed lines and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)   144.5   165.0   201.8  
Telephone average cost of local call (US$ per three 
minutes)   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)   3.9   14.5   15.9  
Internet users   1,200.0   52,600.0   60,000.0  
Paved roads (% of total)   86.9   ..   ..  
Aircraft departures   1,600.0   3,700.0   3,900.0  
Trade and finance  
Trade in goods as a share of GDP (%)   106.0   96.6   99.1  
Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP (%)   163.1   177.1   ..  
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)   22.5   3.3   2.6  
Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting 
country (current US$)   78.7 million   142.8 million   93.5 million  
Present value of debt (current US$)   0.0   1.1 billion   1.1 billion  
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)   11.2   16.8   19.4  
Short-term debt outstanding (current US$)   4.0 million   27.6 million   21.5 million  
Aid per capita (current US$)   15.1   28.7   27.9  
Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2003 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 255 – Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz 
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Table 2. Moldovan elections, 1989 –2003 
 
1991 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Mircea Snegur (sole candidate)  98.17% 
1994 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
  Votes (%)  Seats 
Agrarian Democratic Party  43.2  54 (56?) 
Socialist Unity Bloc and „”Jedinstvo Movement  22.0  27(28) 
Block of Peasants and Intelectuals  9.2  11 
Christian Democratic Popular Front  7.5  9 
1995 LOCAL ELECTIONS 
  Votes (%)   
Agrarian Democratic Party  47.0  64.8 
Aliance of Democratic Forces  19.7  10.3 
Party of Communists  15.7  5.3 
Socialist Unity Bloc  7.2  1.6 
Social Democratic Party  2.3  2.6 
1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
  1st round (%)  2nd round (%) 
Petru Lucinschi  27.7  54.0 
Mircea Snegur  38.8  46.0 
Vladimir Voronin  10.2   
Andrei Sangheli  9.5   
Valeriu Matei  8.9   
1998 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
  Votes (%)  Seats 
Party of Communists  30.1  40 
Democratic Convention  19.4  26 
Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova  18.1  24 
Party of Democratic Forces  8.8  11 
1999 LOCAL ELECTIONS 
  Votes for councils 
Votes (%) 
Majors (%) 
Party of Communists+Agrarians+ Socialists  32.1  22.8 
Centrist Alliance of Moldova  18.5  14.8 
Democratic Convention of Moldova 
Party of Democratic Forces 
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2001 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
  Votes (%)  Seats 
The Communist Party of Moldova  50.1  71 
Braghis Alliance  13.4  19 
Christian Democratic People’s Party  8.2  11 
     
2003 LOCAL ELECTIONS 
  Votes for councils Votes (%)(%) 
The Communist Party of Moldova  44.8 
Our Moldova  20.2 
Democratic Party  7.7 
Independent candidates  5.5 
Block „SDP-SLP”  4.5 
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List of interviews  
Individual Interviews 
 
1.  Barbarosie Arcadie, Institute for Public Policy (also Chairman of Soros Foundation Moldova)  
(19.06.2003, 14.00-15.00) 
2.  Botan Igor, Association for Participatory Democracy ADEPT (16.06.2003, 12.30-14.30) 
3.  Brigidin Andrey, League for Defence of Human Rights in Moldova (14.06.2006, 12.30-15.00) 
4.  Cibotaru Viorel, Institute for Public Policy (19.06.2003, 17.00-18.30) 
5.  Coada Claudia, European Youth Exchange Moldova (20.06.2003, 13.00-15.00) 
6.  Godea Mihai, CONTACT (17.06.2003, 10.00-13.00) 
7.  Gudim Anatol, Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms (17.06.2003, 14.00-16.00) 
8.  Moldovanu Iosif, European Youth Exchange Moldova (1998-2002, President of National Youth 
Council) (20.06.2003, 13.00-15.00) 
9.  Muraru Victor, Professor, Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication, State University of 
Moldova (19.06.2003, 16.00-17.00) 
10.  Niculita Aliona, CONTACT (17.06.2003, 10.00-13.00; 20.06.2003, 15.00-16.00) 
11.  Prebinos Mihail, Association of Mayors and Local Communities of the Republic of Moldova 
(16.06.2003, 15.00-19.00) 
12.  Tomsa Sergiu, European Youth Exchange Moldova (20.06.2003, 13.00-15.00) 
13.  Trembitska Julia, Member of The Society for Overall Development of Children (15.06.2003, 
18.00-23.00) 
14.  Trombitsky Ilya, Ecological Society “Biotica” (former member of Parliament, author of the Law 
on Non-governmental Organizations in Moldova) (15.06.2003, 18.00-23.00) 
15.  Uritu Stefan, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Moldova (16.06.2003, 10.00-12.00) 
16.  Ursu Viorel, Civil Society Program Director, Soros Foundation Moldova (19.06.2003, 15.00-
16.00) 
 
Roundtable (18.06.2003, 13.00-15.00, Tiraspol, Transnistria) 
 
17.  Abramova Juliana, World Window   
18.  Alistratova Oksana, Interaction 
19.  Behselets  Vyacheslav, Common Home 
20.  Belova Svetlana, Every Child 
21.  Gavrishlev Dmitry, Common Home 
22.  Peshevich Svetlana, Interaction 
23.  Sorochan Alexandr, World Window 